Museums' commitment to immigrant integration: A quantitative analysis

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Abstract

We exploit the rich information provided by the 2015 Italian museum census to investigate the factors associated to a greater probability for a museum to address immigrant audiences, with a special focus on their size and dynamics and the relevance of the anti-immigrant sentiment in the local context of reference. We proxy the latter with the municipal vote shares for the parties with an anti-immigrant agenda in the 2013 national elections. While our evidence on the role of immigrant demography is not robust, Lega Nord vote share is found to have a significantly negative, sizable coefficient. We control for a number of context variables and some specific museum characteristics, some of which (size, age, type of collection) turn out to be positively associated to a museum's commitment to immigrant integration.

Keywords: museums; immigrants; anti-immigrant sentiment

JEL classification: H44; Z18; J61; D78

1. Introduction

In the last decades migratory flows have intensified at the global level and refugee crises are becoming of unprecedented proportions in many parts of the world. Governing these phenomena has become one of the major challenges for host societies, particularly in Europe. The question is not just about the need to respond to the problems associated with immigrants and refugees in the short run,

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but it also concerns fundamental political choices having an impact, in perspective, on the degree of cultural diversity, social cohesion and economic development. Immigrants may be an economic resource for the hosting regions or countries (Ottaviano and Peri, 2006; Boubtane et al., 2016), yet immigrants' integration patterns and the different policy approaches to cultural integration (i.e. no commitment, commitment to cultural assimilation or to multiculturalism) may lead to very different equilibria (Algan et al., 2013). It is therefore of paramount importance to implement those integration policies, involving both immigrants and residents, that maximise the potential positive contribution of immigrants to economy and society.

Museums and cultural institutions have historically played an instrumental role for stimulating socialization and intercultural dialogue. Cultural policy is recognized as a powerful tool for promoting immigrants' integration in the present. This recognition is testified by the increasing attention paid to this theme both at the European Union level and by several national cultural policy agendas (Council of Europe/ERIcarts 2018). In a similar vein, many local authorities have launched cultural initiatives (festivals, cultural events, awards, etc.) to favour the integration of immigrants, as documented by OECD in a recent report on the integration of immigrants and refugees at the local level (OECD, 2018).

However, much of the scholarly interest on cultural programs involving immigrant audiences has remained at the practitioners' level. The objectives of most of this literature are sharing best practices and designing guidelines on arts and heritage educational programs focused on intercultural dialogue and empowerment of immigrants (IFA, 2012; NEMO, 2016; Golding and Walklate eds., 2019). It is meant for cultural institutions (still the majority in some national contexts) that have not started such cultural programs yet, and wish to do it.

In fact, there is a lot of variation in museums' targeting immigrant audiences. This very circumstance is interesting per se, but no theoretical studies identifying the factors associated with a cultural institution's willingess to address immigrant audiences have been published so far. From an empirical perspective, lack of available quantitative data on the phenomenon has hindered the investigation of the subject.

We therefore break new ground and conduct a quantitative analysis on museums' promotion policies targeted at immigrants. We exploit the rich database originated by the 2015 Italian museum census, which included a specific question on the subject. Our covariates include variables both relative to the characteristics of museums and capturing the local context.

Among the latter, we pay a special attention to local residents' attitudes towards immigration, which we proxy using the local vote shares of parties with an anti-immigration political platform. In this respect, this contribution may be read also as an attempt to investigate the impact of the rise of

anti-immigration parties on cultural policy. Much effort has been devoted to the analysis of the characteristics and causes of the recent populist right-wing wave in Europe, but not so much on the consequences of it. The policy-makers we consider here are museums' directors. Not all of them are, strictly speaking, politically accountable, because some museums are owned by private institutions. Yet the Italian case is interesting in this respect, because the majority of museums are public, and the large majority of private ones live, to a great extent, on government grants. This is likely to make museum directors particularly sensitive to the local political context.

Our findings show that when it comes to museums' commitment to immigrant integration, local political preferences matter: in particular, a higher local vote share for Lega Nord, a self-declared anti-immigration party, is associated with lower probability for a museum to implement promotion policies targeted at immigrants. Other interesting findings are that museum's specific characteristics matter: ceteris paribus, bigger and younger museums, contemporary art and ethnographic museums are associated with a higher probability to engage immigrant visitors, while public outsourced museums, which are more inclined to organise revenue-generating activities than cultural initiatives implying only costs, are associated with lower probability to commit to immigrant integration.

The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 illustrates the analytical framework in detail, and we express the thesis we wish to test. Section 3 presents our empirical strategy and the data we use. Section 4 shows results. Section 5 describes robustness checks and in Section 6 we draw our conclusions.

2. Analytical framework

To address the factors associated with museums' choice to develop cultural programs for immigrant audiences, we make reference to both demand and supply-side arguments stemming from different streams of the economic literature.

A first argument is linked to the economic justification of the non-profit sector. According to Weisbrod (1977; 1998), there are both government and market failures in the supply of collective goods targeted at specific segments of the population such as immigrants, where non-profit organisations tend to be superior providers. In a society with heterogeneous public interests and public decision by majority rule, only public goods that meet majority interests are provided. In the absence of any alignment with majority interests, public goods that are specific to either a geographic area or a community of any particular characteristic may need to find alternative provision mechanisms. In this context, the existence and role of non-profit organizations serving immigrants is well documented. In fact, this population segment usually represents a minority group within a

community, and its interests are rarely represented in political terms (Hung, 2007; Joassart-Marcelli, 2013).

The essential non-profit nature of museums has since long been recognized as the predominant form of organization, regardless of their public or private ownership structure (Frey and Meier, 2006). As non-profit operators, museums may be thus interested in implementing promotion policies targeted at immigrants. The merit good nature of art consumption justifies the objective of attracting new visitors from marginalized population groups, fostering the access to the local heritage and cultural supply.

Consequently, we expect that the higher the immigrant population in a geographical area, the higher the demand for cultural services by this segment, the more likely museums are to implement promotion programs targeting such an audience. It is not only the share of immigrant population that matters but also how immigration dynamics affect or generate possible tensions in a local community. Thus, we hypothesize that museums are more likely to be active players in targeting immigrant audiences in areas of higher immigrant inflows.

Besides the above demand side arguments, a political economy reading of the supply of museums' cultural programs is also possible. Considering the political sensitivity of policies favouring the integration of immigrants in many local contexts, political factors may play a role. While museums and heritage institutions might be interested in targeting immigrants to reach educational and intercultural dialogue goals within their mission, the political preferences of local audiences and stakeholders against pro-immigrant policies might hinder the ability of museums to pursue such strategies. There is indeed growing evidence of a negative relationship between perceived presence of immigrants and natives' support for the welfare state and preferences for redistribution (Alesina et al., 2018; Brady and Finnigan, 2014). Considering museums' services as a form of cultural welfare, this argument is reminiscent of the specificities with which political accountability issues affect cultural policy (Bertacchini and Dalle Nogare, 2015) and applies especially, but not exclusively, when museums are publicly owned. As a result, we also test whether the magnitude of natives' negative sentiment towards immigrants affects how likely a museum is to implement promotion strategies targeting immigrants.

3. Data and empirical strategy

We exploit the rich database originated by the second Italian Museum Census, which includes questions on whether a museum has implemented promotion policies and if it has implemented

promotion policies targeted at foreign residents in 2015.[1] Our dataset consists of more than 2000 units. All the museums that answered to the second question gave affirmative answer to the first. Therefore the museums in our dataset that have not engaged immigrant audiences in 2015 had sufficient financial means to set up some promotion campaigns. As a result, it is plausible that their choice *not* to target it at immigrants is not a matter of lack of lack of resources, but rather of preferences.

Our model is the following:

$$y_{ij} = a + \beta' ForRes_j + +\delta' PoliticalSentiment_j + \eta' X_i + \theta' Z_j + \varepsilon_i$$

The dependent variable y_{ij} defines whether or not museum *i* in area *j* has implemented a promotion program targeting immigrant audiences. $ForRes_j$ is a set of variables related to immigrant population in area *j*, $PoliticalSentiment_j$ refers to measures of political support for parties with an anti-immigration position, X_i is a set of covariates capturing museum i characteristics and Z_j are the characteristics of area j.

A fundamental choice in our empirical strategy is the one about the size of the local area of reference. As argued by Barone et al. (2016), focusing on smaller areas is advisable when dealing with migration issues. In fact, attitudes towards immigration mainly depend on the very local labour market conditions and the degree of competition for locally provided public goods, such as pre-school services and social housing. We therefore choose municipalities as our reference areas: all demographic and political variables are calculated at the municipal level. Cultural heritage in Italy is not concentrated in few big cities, as the 2049 museums of our sample located in 1239 municipalities testify.

The immigrant demography of the local context ($ForRes_j$) is proxied by two variables: the share of foreign residents on total population (*ForresS*) and the percent variation of foreign residents over 2012-2015 (*ForresVAR*), both calculated at the municipal level.

As to the political preferences of the population in the municipality ($PoliticalSentiment_j$), we consider the vote share of Lega Nord (*LN*), the vote share of right-wing parties except LN (*RightnoLN*) and that of the 5 Star Movement (*5SM*) in the 2013 national election (Chamber of Deputies data). 2013 election results represent Italian voters' preferences at a point in time which is

[1] Foreign residents are a good proxy for immigrants in Italy, though illegal immigrants are not included. Immigration is a relatively recent phenomenon in Italy, and the vast majority of immigrants come from low-income East European, African and Asian countries. Foreign residents from rich EU countries and the US are a small minority never reaching 5% of the total.

both prior and close to 2015.[2] The advantage of considering national elections is that the electoral rules are the same no matter the municipality size, and the political platforms of the competing parties are clearer and not conditioned by local circumstances. Lega, the two major right-wing parties (Fratelli d'Italia and la Destra) and the 5 Star Movement presented candidates in all electoral districts in 2015.[3] Extreme-right parties (Forza Nuova, Casa Pound, Rivoluzione Missina and Freiheitlichen), which we here include in *RightnoLN*, were not all present everywhere but in the vast majority of districts at least one was present.[4] The 2013 election turnout was 75.19%.

Our focus on the above mentioned parties has to do with their political programmes, and in particular their political stance vis a vis immigrants. Lega Nord has always had clear anti-immigration political stance, and all right-wing parties an "Italy first" agenda. 5SM's position with respect to immigration was not so clear; the topic was not in their agenda, as a result of their electorate being strongly divided on the subject (Biorcio, 2014). Yet Iacoboni (2018) reports signs of anti-immigrants sentiments in 5SM's leaders as early as the late 2000ies.

Due to a number of scandals concerning Lega's financial management in 2011-12, LN was not very strong in 2013. The other centre-right parties were relatively new, the result of the dissolution of the National Alliance party. This is to say that both Lega and the right-wing parties' electorates in 2013 were made up mainly by core voters, while protest vote mainly converged on 5SM.[5]

Our controls include variables capturing the specific characteristics of museums, and variables capturing the local context. We take the former from the census, and the latter from official data on population and industry.

In particular, we consider:

- museum size, proxied by the number of employees (*noemployees*);
- museum age (*after80* = 1 if the museum was born after 1979; more recent museums have public spaces not dedicated to the collection, often used for engaging audiences);

[2] Due to the fact that both regional and municipal elections are staggered in Italy, these elections were the last ones simultaneously covering the whole country before 2015 except for the 2014 European elections, which had a much lower turnout.

[3] Districts have the size of a region or of a large subset of it.

[4] While Lega, FdI and D were part of a coalition including Silvio Berlusconi's party, 5SM ran alone, and it was its first time at a national election. Also extreme-right parties ran alone.

[5] In the 2013 elections the competitors were a centre-left, a centre-right and a centre coalitions, the 5 Star Movement and a number of other smaller parties, among which extreme-right ones. The centre coalition obtained a poor result (10%), the centre-left and centre-right both obtained 29% and the 5 Star Movement 25%.

- the type of collection, drawing from practitioners' literature the idea that contemporary art (*contempart*) and ethnographic collections (*ethno*) make a museum more suitable for immigrants' engagement;
- whether a museum is private or public, distinguishing among the former between museums belonging to the Catholic Church (*priCC*) and other private museums (*prinoCC*), and distinguishing among the latter, following Bertacchini et al. (2018), between outsourced (*outs*), autonomous (*auto*) and public museums with classic organisation structure (reference category), i.e. run as sub-units of culture departments. Overall this means to counterpose incentive vs. no incentive to revenue generation;
- log of population (*pop*) at the provincial level, proxying potential audience;
- log of tourist beds at the provincial level (*tourism*), capturing the tourist vocation of an area, and hence the possible bias of the museum in favour of tourism-related promotion policies at the expense of social inclusion initiatives;
- number of museums (*musnumber*) in the same municipality (counting also those that did not answer the question we investigate), because more museums may lead to mission specialisation or imitation.

Table 1 illustrates all variables' descriptive statistics.

We use logit to run our regressions. The cross-sectional nature of our dataset makes it impossible to detect causal relationships, so our results should be interpreted as correlations. With respect to the immigration variables, reverse causality cannot be ruled out in principle, but it is unlikely. In fact, it is hard to think that an immigrant family's choice where to live depends on the promotion policies of a museum, which they may well not to be aware of if they do not live in a town yet.[6] Still, with reference to the relationship between museum policies and residential location choices of immigrants, it may well be that both depend on local economic conditions. We deal with this problem by introducing NUTS1 macro-areas dummies accounting for Italy's stark economic gap between North, Centre. and South plus Islands.

4. Results

Table 2 presents marginal effects of logit estimates of a number of models. Standard errors are clustered at municipality level. In the first column we regress our dependent variable on those

[6] Bracco et al. (2017) find that immigrants' residential location choice is affected by the political stance of mayors. We abstract from local politics here, though we are aware that some positive correlation may exist between preferences expressed in national elections and preferences expressed in local elections.

accounting for immigration flows and stocks in the municipality where the museum is located. While the first covariate is significant and has a positive sign, as expected, the second has a negative sign, but it is only significant at the 10% level. This evidence is suggestive of the idea that museums produce services paying attention to the evolution in time of their potential audience, and they are conscious of their role as facilitators of integration processes for those who have recently come to town. However, this evidence is not always confirmed when other covariates are included.

Model 2 illustrates what happens if we include the variables accounting both for specific museum characteristics and for the local context. The percentage of recent immigrants on municipality population stays significantly positive, whereas the percentage of total immigrants on municipality population loses significance. Among the variables capturing a museum's specificity we find that being a large museum in terms of number employees, and being born after the 70ies, ceteris paribus, are both positively correlated with our dependent variable, though being large only reaches the 10% significance level. We also observe that being a contemporary art museum is associated with higher probability to be immigrant-friendly; as for ethnographic museums, the evidence of a vocation in this respect is, statistically speaking, not so strong. This evidence is compatible with the idea either that contemporary art museums are the most suitable for approaching foreign resident communities, or that international best practices tend to spread among contemporary art museums faster. As for ownership, we do not find any evidence of the impact of being private (no matter the type of owner, either the Church or others) on the likelihood to set up promotions for immigrants. Among public museums, those that have been outsourced do seem to be different with respect to the reference category, i.e. public museums dependent on government transfers and run as sub-units of culture departments. The sign of the marginal effect is negative and significant at the 5% level. This evidence may be explained as follows: when a public museum is outsourced, it can retain its revenues and has its own budget, often receiving from the outsourcing government smaller transfers than before. Typically, it starts showing a clear preference for revenue-generating activities and policies, which is unlikely to be the case when one thinks of initiatives aimed at social inclusion.[7] The local context, in terms of characteristics of potential demand, does not seem to matter much: both population and tourism vocation have statistically insignificant estimated coefficients. A rise in the number of museums in the same municipality seems to be associated with higher probability to set up pro-integration initiatives, though the significance is just 10%. Clearly, this variable accounts for the

[7] In some sense, this is a bias, as it may interfere with museums' commitment to the real needs of a community. Notice that also autonomous museums retain their revenues and have their own budget; in this model, their estimated coefficient is not significant, but it turns so (at the 10% level) in model 3 and 6.

possible strategic interaction between museums in a very simple way; further investigation, possibly using spatial econometrics, is needed to corroborate our findings.

Models 3-5 add the political dimension to our model. Model 3 highlights that the municipal share of votes for Lega Nord is negatively associated, ceteris paribus, with the probability for a museum located in that municipality to try to engage the local immigrants. The effect is sizable and quite robust. This is in line with the thesis that stronger anti-immigration feeling in town discourages museums to propose policies for immigrant integration. Model 4 and 5 show that the impact of right-wing parties (LN excluded) and the 5 Star Movement is not significant. However, if we regress all three vote shares (model 6), 5SM reaches the 10% significance.

If we add geographical NUTS1 macro-areas (model 7), the picture changes considerably for the variables accounting for immigration: both their estimates turn out to be statistically insignificant. This reveals that immigrants' increase, in percentage terms, has a strong geographical connotation, with the South (reference category) having, on average, a higher value for this variable (Table 3). As Southern regions are different from other areas of the country in many other ways, not all accounted for by the set of our explanatory variables, the macro-areas variables turn out to be highly significant. This may be somewhat surprising, considering that macro-areas have no specific meaning in the context of Italy's cultural policy. Yet if the sophistication of cultural policies is correlated to economic development, which also drives immigrant flows, introducing macro-areas dummies clearly makes sense. The sign and significance of all other covariates are unaffected, save for LN, whose significance is now at 5%. The fact that this significance survives the introduction of NUTS1 macro-areas dummies is a rather striking result, considering that this party was deeply rooted only in the Northern regions in 2013. A 1% increase in the local LN vote share lowers the probability that a museum implements pro-immigrant policies by more than 70%, a very sizable effect. Notice also that all the political variables have the expected negative sign in this specification. Model 8 interacts macro-regions with immigrant flows; the interaction terms are all insignificant, whereas the rest of the covariates' estimated coefficients retain the same sign and significance.

5. Robustness checks

As an alternative to municipal measures of anti-immigrant sentiments, we made use of the data collected in 2011 by ISTAT in a survey (about 44.000 interviews) on the attitudes of Italians vis a vis immigrants. Respondents could choose between friendly, indifferent, diffident and hostile. The

results are available at NUTS1 level. We have summed the percentage of "diffident" and "hostile" answers and created a negative sentiment proxy having four values. Its estimated coefficient turns out to be highly significant and negative, with all the rest of the covariates having estimates that are similar in value and significance to those of model 7. This seems to corroborate our idea that using vote shares in favour of anti-immigration parties makes sense. We have also interacted the macro-areas dummies with the corresponding value for the negative sentiment, and used three of them (reference category: sentiment in the South) as an alternative to the use of a single negative sentiment variable. Again, results are similar to those of model 7.

We have included a number of other covariates accounting for a museum's characteristics, but none of them ever turned out to be significant. The variables are the following: whether the cultural institution is a museum, a monument or an archaeological site; museum surface; number of employees per surface unit, accounting for the combination of input factors; whether the museum is part of a museum network or a network of institutions promoting the local area.

We have then considered subsamples. If we replicate model 7 considering only the provincial administrative centres, i.e. the biggest cities in each province (544 museums in about 100 cities), of all museums' characteristics the only ones retaining significance are size and being a contemporary art museum. LN coefficient estimate is negative, but now only significant at the 10% level. Barone et al. (2016) argue that in the most populated Italian municipalities immigration is not a significant driver of the centre-right coalition performance in the national elections of 2001, 2006 and 2008. They explain this finding by saying that in cities immigration started sooner, residents are on average more educated and segmented neighbourhoods may lower the perception of the possible negative sides of immigration. It may then well be that in the case of provincial administrative centres a vote for LN, for a right-wing party and for 5SM is not as a good proxy for anti-immigration sentiments as in smaller municipalities. If we consider the sample of museums in smaller municipalities, in model 6 both LN and 5SM have significantly negative coefficient estimates, while in model 7 only 5SM has (at the 10% level).

6. Conclusions

Our analysis is a first attempt to analyse the commitment of museums to policies targeted at immigrants. We use a large dataset based on the 2015 Italian Museum Census to investigate the factors associated with greater probability for a museum to commit.

Our evidence shows that bigger and younger museums, as well as contemporary art and ethnographic museums are associated with higher probability to engage with immigrant visitors, ceteris paribus. On the contrary, public outsourced museums are associated with lower probability to engage in pro-immigrant policies, which we explain as a consequence of their having a bias for proposing revenue-generating activities instead of educational initiatives only entailing costs.

Museums' commitment to immigrant integration also seems to be affected by the local anti-immigrant sentiment, here proxied by the share of votes for Lega Nord, the party with the strongest anti-immigration political stance (other anti-immigrant parties' votes do not seem to be relevant). We read this finding as a sign that museum directors' agenda, no matter the needs of the community and their own political preferences, may be influenced by the local socio-political context.

This last evidence is perhaps relevant not just in the confined domain of cultural policy. To our knowledge, our analysis is one of the first considering the consequences, in terms of implemented spending policies, of the recent surge of populist right-wing sentiments and parties in Europe. We conducted it avoiding adopting the traditional political economy empirical framework where quantitative aggregate fiscal spending indicators are on the left hand side of the model and the left-right dimension of the ruling party is on the right hand side. In fact, in our view, the adoption of such an approach may lead to an underestimation of the impact for two distinct reasons. One is the use of quantitative aggregate policy indicators, such as spending in general or spending for a certain budget item: in fact, policy is not just on how much money you spend, but also or *on what* you spend it *within* each policy domain. The other reason, highlighted by Schumacher and van Kersbergen (2016), is that there may be an impact irrespective of the fact that anti-immigrant parties are on power. In fact, the surge of populism activates a self-censorship attitude towards their preferred political choices in the parties confronting them, a standard Downsian effect. Our empirical strategy detects a negative association between anti-immigrant *sentiment* and the probability for museums to commit to immigrant integration bypassing the political affiliation of the local policy-makers (who may or may not share anti-immigrant attitudes). Seen from a normative perspective, this finding may be read in two different ways. On the one hand, it testifies that museum directors are conscious of their role as policy makers, and given that, more often than not, they manage public money they must be accountable to their community. On the other hand, and on a more negative tone, it tells that being political accountable may be considered as a dubious merit, in a context where part of the community has no right to vote, as in the case of foreign residents in Italy. It may also clash with a community's best interest in the long run. In fact, the short-termism characterising populist visions (Guiso et al., 2017) contrasts with the need to adopt immigrant integration policies for future prosperity.

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Table 1 – Descriptive statistics.

	Mean	Standard Deviation
forresVAR	0.251	0.290
forresS	0.086	0.046
noemployees	12.500	23.867
after80	0.751	0.432
contempart	0.133	0.340
ethno	0.171	0.376
priCC	0.071	0.256
priNOCC	0.262	0.440
outs	0.158	0.365
auto	0.081	0.273
pop	9.729	1.995
tourism	10.616	1.014
musnumber	9.841	20.327
LN	0.035	0.051
rightnoLN	0.035	0.033
5SM	0.237	0.061
northwest	0.208	0.406
northeast	0.258	0.438
center	0.288	0.453

Table 2 – Logit model estimation, marginal effects at mean. Clustered standard errors by municipality in parenthesis.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
forresVAR	0.1111***	0.1038**	0.0813**	0.1047**	0.1026**	0.0737*	0.0392	0.0326
	(0.0399)	(0.0438)	(0.0413)	(0.0436)	(0.0438)	(0.0415)	(0.0388)	(0.046)
forresS	-0.4273*	-0.3855	-0.153	-0.369	-0.4066	-0.1835	0.4055	0.4231
	(0.229)	(0.2569)	(0.2559)	(0.2575)	(0.2565)	(0.2539)	(0.2905)	(0.2919)
noemployees		0.0008*	0.0009**	0.0008*	0.0008*	0.0009*	0.0008*	0.0008*
		(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
after80		0.0661***	0.0574***	0.0662***	0.0671***	0.0589***	0.0552***	0.0542**
		(0.0207)	(0.0212)	(0.0207)	(0.0206)	(0.021)	(0.0211)	(0.0211)
contempart		0.1***	0.0998***	0.1008***	0.0997***	0.0987***	0.0986***	0.1005***
		(0.0298)	(0.0299)	(0.0299)	(0.0298)	(0.0298)	(0.0301)	(0.0303)
ethno		0.0497*	0.0563**	0.0504*	0.0487*	0.0541**	0.0564**	0.0559**
		(0.0263)	(0.0265)	(0.0263)	(0.0262)	(0.0263)	(0.0264)	(0.0264)
priCC		-0.0229	-0.0218	-0.023	-0.0242	-0.0257	-0.0316	-0.0317
		(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.0359)	(0.0356)	(0.0347)	(0.0347)
priNOCC		0.007	0.0141	0.0061	0.0055	0.0113	0.0127	0.0146
		(0.0226)	(0.0228)	(0.0227)	(0.0227)	(0.0227)	(0.0229)	(0.0231)
outs		-0.0503**	-0.0558**	-0.0494*	-0.0494*	-0.0552**	-0.0546**	-0.0535**
		(0.0255)	(0.0248)	(0.0256)	(0.0256)	(0.0249)	(0.025)	(0.0252)
auto		-0.0438	-0.0489*	-0.0427	-0.0433	-0.0498*	-0.0481	-0.0457
		(0.0309)	(0.0297)	(0.0311)	(0.031)	(0.0297)	(0.0299)	(0.0304)
pop		-0.0035	-0.0089	-0.0024	-0.0021	-0.0067	-0.0106	-0.01
		(0.0066)	(0.0066)	(0.0067)	(0.0067)	(0.0068)	(0.0071)	(0.0071)
tourism		-0.0101	-0.0131	-0.0121	-0.0109	-0.0142	-0.0059	-0.006
		(0.0102)	(0.0101)	(0.0104)	(0.0102)	(0.0103)	(0.0107)	(0.0106)
musnumber		0.0008*	0.0007	0.0007	0.0007	0.0006	0.0008*	0.0006
		(0.0005)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.0006)
LN			-0.9222***			-1.0556***	-0.6744**	-0.7212**
			(0.2292)			(0.2498)	(0.3011)	(0.3016)
RightnoLN				0.2692		-0.2122	-0.0644	-0.1289
				(0.2531)		(0.2979)	(0.2955)	(0.2937)
5SM					-0.1205	-0.3327*	-0.2866	-0.2979*
					(0.1574)	(0.1811)	(0.1802)	(0.1793)
northwest							-0.093***	-0.1071***
							(0.0331)	(0.0354)
northeast							-0.1142***	-0.0869**
							(0.0294)	(0.0383)
center							-0.0886***	-0.1033***
							(0.0281)	(0.0356)
forresVAR* northwest								0.0981 (0.0877)
forresVAR* northeast								-0.2213 (0.1559)
forresVAR* center								0.0805 (0.1096)
Observations	2,049	2,049	2,049	2,049	2,049	2,049	2,049	2,049
AIC	2,066.7	2,048.4	2,031.6	2,049.4	2,049.8	2,031.6	2,023.0	2024.3

Table 3 – Mean of forresVAR by NUTS1.

NUTS1	count	mean	standard deviation
North-west	427	0.183	0.203
North east	529	0.155	0.157
Center	589	0.209	0.203
South + Islands	504	0.457	0.417

Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test: chi-squared = 352.13, df = 3, p-value < 2.2e-16